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EvidenceCorner | Spousal Privilege
He loves me? He loves me not? 
He wants to keep me from testifying?
By Cynthia Ford
Valentine’s Day having just passed, I thought I would devote 
this month to the Spousal Privilege as it exists in Montana.  
They don’t show this on any of the jewelry store ads in early 
February, but under some circumstances, buying a wedding 
ring might also buy you freedom.  You don’t have to return the 
ring, but you should at least be aware of the legal implications 
of the nuptials.
PRIVILEGES IN GENERAL
A privilege protects a confidential communication between 
two qualifying persons from disclosure in discovery1 and at 
trial, even if the communication is both relevant and extremely 
important to the determination of a fact at issue in the litiga-
tion.  Every privilege necessarily impedes the search for truth, 
and consequently, justice.  I think of privilege as a gag in the 
mouth of someone who KNOWS, having gotten the informa-
tion from “the horse’s mouth,” but who is prevented from 
saying what he was told, even though in some circumstances 
he affirmatively may want to disclose the contents of the 
communication.  
The justification for the privileges which are recognized by 
the law is uniform: the relationship between the persons to the 
communication itself serves the public good, and the ability of 
the parties to speak freely and without fear of later disclosure 
is essential to that beneficial relationship.  Thus, if the commu-
nication is made in confidence and kept in confidence, the law 
will honor that confidence.  The relationship in effect trumps 
the interest in the complete truth. M.C.A. 26-1-801 expresses 
this:
26-1-801. Policy to protect confidentiality in 
certain relations. There are particular relations 
in which it is the policy of the law to encourage 
confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, 
a person cannot be examined as a witness in the 
cases enumerated in this part.
THE MONTANA V. FEDERAL  
APPROACHES TO PRIVILEGE 
The state and federal privilege regimes are very different 
1  Both the state and federal versions of Civil Procedure Rule 26 state that a party 
may discover any matter which is relevant (and this term is construed more broad-
ly than at trial) AND “non-privileged.”
procedurally.  Under the FRE, in non-diversity cases2, federal 
evidentiary privileges are expressly judge-made.  FRE 501 states:
The common law — as interpreted by United 
States courts in the light of reason and experience 
— governs a claim of privilege unless any of the 
following provides otherwise:
• the United States Constitution;
• a federal statute; or
• rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.3
FRE 501 is a Congressional revision to the version of FRE 
Article V submitted by the Supreme Court, which actually 
contained several specific rules, each setting forth the terms of 
a particular privilege.  Congress morphed these into a single 
rule, 501, conferring the development of federal evidentiary 
privilege law on the federal courts, case-by-case.  For more 
explanation of this remarkable sleight-of-hand, see Trammel v. 
U.S.  Montana’s privilege law is exactly the opposite.  Montana’s 
privileges are found solely in legislation.  MRE 501 provides:
Rule 501. Privileges recognized only as 
provided. Except as otherwise provided by 
constitution, statute, these rules, or other rules 
applicable in the courts of this state, no person has 
a privilege to: 
(1) refuse to be a witness;
(2) refuse to disclose any matter; 
(3) refuse to produce any object or writing; 
or 
(4) prevent another from being a witness 
or disclosing any matter or producing any 
object or writing.
In addition to MRE 501, Article V contains one specific 
2  FRE 501’s last sentence provides that in diversity cases, privilege is to be de-
termined by state law.  This clear statement obviates the need for that sticky Erie 
determination of whether evidentiary privileges are substantive (state law) or 
procedural (federal).
3  The Constitutional reference is to the privilege against self-incrimination.  
Congress has not enacted any privilege statutes itself, and the only other “rule 
prescribed by the Supreme Court” is FRE 502 (effective 12/1/2011), which deals 
not with a privilege per se but treatment of disclosures of attorney-client and 
work-product material.
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privilege (Rule 502, privilege of government to refuse to disclose 
the identity of a confidential informant, which became effective 
in 1990).  The rest of Montana’s privileges are located primarily4 
in Title 26, Chapter 1, Part 8 of the MCA, entitled “Privileges.”  
The Commission Comment to MRE 501 makes it very clear that 
Montana intends its privilege law to come from the legislature, 
rather than the judicial approach adopted by the FRE:
The rule provides that only the privileges 
incorporated by reference shall be recognized and 
so has the effect of cutting off any further case law 
recognition of privileges. The final four clauses in 
this rule represent a delineation of the elements 
of a testimonial privilege and are intended to 
clarify privileges generally. This rule represents a 
new approach to the use of privileges in Montana 
courts.
Notwithstanding the procedural differences in the creation 
of privileges, both the Montana and the U.S. Supreme Courts 
hold that privileges are and to be narrowly construed precisely 
because they abrogate the search for truth.  
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges 
contravene the fundamental principle that “ ‘the 
public ... has a right to every man’s evidence.’ ” As 
such, they must be strictly construed and accepted 
“only to the very limited extent that permitting a 
refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence 
has a public good transcending the normally 
predominant principle of utilizing all rational 
means for ascertaining truth.”  Trammel v. United 
States (1980), 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 912, 
63 L.Ed.2d 186, 195 (citations omitted).
State v. MacKinnon, 1998 MT 78, 288 Mont. 329, 
336, 957 P.2d 23, 27.  See also, State v. Gooding, 
1999 MT 249, 296 Mont. 234, 238, 989 P.2d 304, 
307.
SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL V.  
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGES
States and the federal government differ about which 
relationships to privilege, but some sort of spousal privilege 
(communication, testimonial, or both: see below) is common.  
The marital privileges all stem from the public policy in favor 
of marriage.  “[T]he purpose behind spousal privilege is to pre-
serve the sanctity of the marriage and home.”  In re Marriage of 
Sarsfield, 206 Mont. 397, 406, 671 P.2d 595 (1983).   
There are two types of spousal privilege, each aimed at the 
public policy in favor of marriage but differing in terms of the 
way in which the privilege protects marriage.  Jurisdictions rec-
ognize one or both.  The spousal testimonial privilege prevents 
a person married at the time of trial from testifying, in order to 
preserve the then-existing marriage.  My visual is the witness 
4  Primarily is not the same as exclusively.  As always, a wise practitioner should 
search the rest of the M.C.A. for scattered exceptions.  Spousal privilege is a good 
example: there are applicable statutes in both Title 26 and Title 46.
and defendant leaving the courtroom hand-in-hand, which 
would presumably not occur if she just testified against him.  
(Some of my students report that their marriages are strong 
enough that he would forgive her for her adverse testimony, but 
I have lived longer).  The spousal communications privilege, 
on the other hand, depends on the marital status of the parties 
at the time the communication between the spouses occurred, 
even if they are no longer married at the time of the testimony.  
The theory is that free communication without fear of com-
pelled disclosure is good for marriage, and marriage is good for 
society.  My nickname for this privilege is “the pillow talk privi-
lege,” but I wouldn’t use that in court and of course it covers all 
confidential communications between spouses, whether in the 
bedroom, kitchen, car, or chairlift.
The spousal testimonial privilege operates to keep a spouse 
off the stand altogether in a case involving the other spouse.  In 
its most traditional, Olde Englande, form, this privilege was 
a logical extension of the privilege against self-incrimination.  
The wife was seen as the property of the husband, so if she testi-
fied against her husband, it was as if he was testifying against 
himself.  Although this property view of marriage no longer 
exists, the privilege is extant in many jurisdictions.  In fact, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recently acknowledged the privilege even 
as it narrowed it in Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40, 100 S.Ct. 906, 
63 L.Ed.2d 186 (holding that the privilege belongs solely to the 
witness-spouse, who is the best judge of whether there is a mar-
riage worth preserving5):
[The testimonial] privilege is invoked, not to 
exclude private marital communications, but 
rather to exclude evidence of criminal acts and of 
communications made in the presence of third 
persons.
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S. Ct. 906, 
913, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980).  The Supreme Court elected to 
maintain only a limited form of the privilege, vesting the deci-
sion about whether to testify in the witness-spouse whether 
than the defendant-spouse:
The contemporary justification for affording an 
accused such a privilege is also unpersuasive. 
When one spouse is willing to testify against 
the other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the 
motivation-their relationship is almost certainly 
in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of 
marital harmony for the privilege to preserve. 
In these circumstances, a rule of evidence that 
permits an accused to prevent adverse spousal 
testimony seems far more likely to frustrate justice 
than to foster family peace
445 U.S. at 52, 100 S. Ct. at 913, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 
(1980).  
5  Mrs. Trammel wanted to testify for the government in her husband’s drug case.  
The defendant argued that her testimony was not truly voluntary, induced as it 
was by an offer of immunity from her own prosecution.  The Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of the government, holding that the reason Mrs. Trammel agreed to take 
the stand was irrelevant: 
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The federal system, then, recognizes both the spousal 
communications privilege and a limited form of the spousal 
testimonial privilege.  These federal spousal privileges apply to 
cases in federal court arising from federal questions, but not to 
diversity cases (see F.R.E. 501).  Montana’s privilege law deter-
mines the extent of the spousal privilege in both Montana state 
courts and in diversity actions in federal court where Montana 
law is the rule of decision.
MONTANA’S SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE LAW: 
COMMUNICATIONS BUT NOT TESTIMONIAL 
MARITAL PRIVILEGE
Montana, like the federal courts, does include a privilege for 
spouses.  In fact, it is the first of the twelve specific privileges 
established by the Montana legislature.  In its current form, the 
spousal privilege statute reads: 
26-1-802. Spousal privilege. Neither spouse 
may, without the consent of the other, testify 
during or after the marriage concerning any 
communication made by one to the other 
during their marriage. The privilege is restricted 
to communications made during the existence 
of the marriage relationship and does not extend 
to communications made prior to the marriage 
or to communications made after the marriage is 
dissolved. The privilege does not apply to a civil 
action or proceeding by one spouse against the 
other or to a criminal action or proceeding for a 
crime committed by one spouse against the other 
or against a child of either spouse. (Emphasis 
added)
Another, not inconsistent, statute appears in Title 46, 
Criminal Procedure:
46-16-212. Competency of spouses
(1) Neither spouse may testify to the 
communications or conversations between 
spouses that occur during their marriage unless:
(a) consent of the defendant-spouse is 
obtained;
(b) the defendant-spouse has been charged 
with an act of criminal violence against the 
other; or
(c) the defendant-spouse has been charged 
with abuse, abandonment, or neglect of the 
other spouse or either spouse’s children.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1), a spouse 
is a competent witness for or against the other 
spouse.
The Montana Supreme Court has characterized this statute 
as dealing with the competency of a witness-spouse, while Title 
26 provides the privilege for communications made during the 
marriage when a spouse is a witness:  “both the heading and 
subsection (2) of § 46-16-212, MCA, are clear that the statute 
relates to the competency of spouses to testify, not spousal 
privilege.”  State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489, 495, 
81 P.3d 488, 493.
In State v. Moore, 254 Mont. 241, 836 P.2d 604 (1992), the 
Court addressed MCA 46-16-212, making it clear that it de-
stroys any argument based on the spousal testimonial privilege 
(which would make a spouse incompetent as a witness):
We conclude that testimony by the wife Michelle 
Moore, if it meets other rules of evidence, 
is not to be excluded on the grounds of her 
competency as a witness, unless it is testimony of 
communications and conversation between the 
spouses during their marriage.
254 Mont. at 247, 836 P.2d at 608.
Neither of the above statutes privileges spousal testimony in 
general.  As Baldwin recognized, MCA 46-16-212(2) expressly 
disallows a “spousal testimonial privilege” in criminal cases, and 
the Commission Comment to its 1991 amendment explicitly 
states: “Subsection (2) emphasizes that the privilege applies 
only to communications or conversations.”  This conforms to 
the current language of MCA 26-1-802.  The prior version of 
the same statute contained an additional provision: “A husband 
cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent 
or a wife for or against her husband without his consent.”  The 
removal of this language in the 2005 legislative session ef-
fectively abolished the spousal testimonial privilege.  Thus, in 
Montana civil and criminal cases since 2005, there is a spousal 
communication privilege but not a general spousal testimonial 
privilege.  
The privilege applies to communications made between 
spouses during their marriage, made and kept in confidence, at 
least by the spouse asserting the privilege.  The witness spouse 
can be compelled to testify as to what she observed, even during 
the marriage, but not as to what her husband told her during 
the marriage, if he didn’t tell anyone else about their commu-
nication.  Because this privilege, like all others, is construed nar-
rowly, it does not protect communications between unmarried 
people, no matter how long or how committed their relation-
ship.6  It does apply to couples who are married either through 
the statutory process or through common law.7 Any communi-
cation made after that date of the marriage, until the end of the 
marriage, is privileged. Communications made before or after 
the marriage are not privileged.  
If a couple follows the statutory route to marriage, it is 
6  Because Montana explicitly forbids same-sex marriage, the privilege is unavail-
able to same-sex couples, even where they have participated in a “commitment” 
or other marriage-like ceremony, and even where they have registered with a city 
government (Missoula has such a registry) as life partners.
7  MCA 40-1-403 expressly provides: “Validity of common-law marriage. Com-
mon-law marriages are not invalidated by this chapter…” Montana is commonly 
viewed as having the most liberal common-law marriage law in the country.  
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easy to tell when the marriage, and thus the communication 
privilege, begins and ends: the privilege covers all confidential 
communications after the date of the wedding, reflected by the 
state-issued marriage certificate.  When does the marriage end, 
and thus the privilege for communications between the former 
spouses?  That, too, is an easy question in most circumstances: 
the marital communications privilege does not cover any 
communications between the ex-spouses after the entry of the 
decree of dissolution of the marriage. This applies to both statu-
tory and common-law marriages: the only ways out of either 
are death and formal dissolution.  You can get married through 
common-law, but you can’t get unmarried that way.
These limits make sense in view of the public policy in favor 
of marriage. One of the incentives to marry is the privilege, and 
if the State extended the reach of the privilege, that incentive 
is removed.  On the other end of the timeline, the purpose of 
the privilege is to strengthen the marriage by encouraging full 
and frank conversation between spouses; if they have divorced, 
there is no marriage to strengthen and it is clear that the privi-
lege was not sufficient incentive to keep them married.  In both 
circumstances, the need for information to determine the facts 
and administer justice regains its supremacy and the spousal 
communications privilege disappears.
By its very nature, common law marriage is a much messier 
can of worms than a statutory marriage for purposes of assess-
ing the privilege.  Couples, or a member of a couple, usually 
assert that there was a common law marriage only in retrospect, 
when it has become clear that marital status confers some 
advantage.  Most of those cases involve a claim to the dissolu-
tion procedure for ending the relationship, or an inheritance 
or governmental financial benefit such as Social Security.  The 
spousal communications privilege is another such advantage.  
The Montana Supreme Court has decided a couple of relatively 
recent marital privilege cases where the defendant claimed he 
had married the witness at common law.
STATE V. NETTLETON (1988)
The Montana Supreme Court had the opportunity to eluci-
date both forms of spousal privilege in 1988, when it decided 
State v. Nettleton, 233 Mont. 308, 760 P.2d 733.  Nettleton was 
convicted of deliberate homicide for a 1977 murder.  Two im-
portant witnesses for the State were women who had lived with 
Nettleton, and who had information about both what he said 
to them and what they observed relevant to the murder.  The 
defendant moved in limine to exclude their testimony, claiming 
that he had been married to each (in series) and that the spousal 
privilege prevented both from testifying.
The trial court held a pretrial hearing, taking evidence on the 
issue of whether defendant had been married to either witness.  
The judge found that one of the women, Candace Semenze, had 
been Nettleton’s common law wife from 1975 to 1982 (and thus 
at the time of the crime), and that the other woman, Magdelina 
DuMontier, had been statutorily married to Nettleton from 
July 1983 until June 1986.  Before the Supreme Court, the State 
argued that there had been no common law marriage, but the 
Court affirmed the findings of the trial judge:
The State’s argument to the District Court and 
its brief on appeal emphasize that Nettleton and 
Semenze were never married. According to the 
State, the alleged common-law marriage between 
the two did not have the four elements necessary 
under Montana common law: capability, 
agreement, cohabitation and reputation (citing 
Matter of Estate of Murnion (Mont.1984), 686 
P.2d 893, 41 St.Rep. 1627, and other cases). 
Whether the relationship between Nettleton and 
Semenze fit the legal definition of common-law 
marriage was a question of fact for the District 
Court to decide. That decision must be upheld if 
there is substantial, credible evidence in the record 
to support it. Griffel v. Cove Ditch Co. (1984), 207 
Mont. 348, 675 P.2d 90, 41 St.Rep. 1.
The record shows that while Semenze denied the 
existence of the marriage in her testimony, she 
and Nettleton lived together, had a child, opened 
and used a joint checking account, and filed joint 
income tax returns for two consecutive years. The 
record also shows the filing of a joint petition for 
divorce signed by Semenze and Nettleton. This 
evidence provides a sufficient basis for the District 
Court’s decision that Nettleton and Semenze 
considered themselves married. State v. Nettleton, 
233 Mont. 308, 311-12, 760 P.2d 733, 736 (1988).  
The Court then went on to apply Montana’s spousal privi-
lege to the various pieces of testimony from the ex-wives.  It 
held that the privilege did not apply to:
• Testimony by DuMontier concerning 
Nettleton’s actions and statements after 
the two were divorced … because those 
statements were not made during marriage.
• Testimony involving statements or actions 
by persons other than Nettleton … because 
those were not communications by one 
spouse to the other.
• Testimony about observations of Nettleton’s 
actions; physical evidence such as Brisson’s 
body, her scarf or Nettleton’s knife; 
and feelings such as the fear induced by 
Nettleton’s threats and other behavior.
• Testimony about statements made during 
the marriage, but in the presence of third 
persons; “The presence of third parties 
indicates that Nettleton did not intend those 
statements to be confidential.”
• Testimony about threats by Nettleton to 
induce the wife’s cooperation and silence, “do 
not merit spousal privilege.”
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The Court did find that one part of the testimony should 
have been protected by spousal privilege, so that the judge erred 
in admitting it, but held that the error was harmless:
The one clear instance of testimony that should 
have been protected by the privilege-Nettleton’s 
admission to DuMontier in response to her 
question while they were married-simply restates 
the same information contained in the far greater 
number of non-privileged statements. The failure 
of the District Court to exclude this testimony was 
therefore harmless error.
State v. Nettleton, 233 Mont. 308, 317-18, 760 P.2d 
733, 739 (1988).
STATE V. BALDWIN (2003)
In State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489, 495, 81 
P.3d 488, 493, the defendant objected to testimony from Karin 
Baldwin, whom the government had called as a hostile witness.  
The defendant objected to her testimony at trial, claiming that 
Karin was his common-law spouse and that he was entitled 
to a spousal communications privilege.  Karin and Baldwin 
solemnized their marriage on October 16, 2001, after Baldwin 
had been charged, but before his trial on December 3, 2001.  
(Baldwin also argued that he and Karin had been in a common-
law marriage for six years prior to the ceremony, so that the 
privilege extended to the communications between them from 
1995.)  The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the 
testimony.  The Supreme Court found error8:
We conclude that because Baldwin and Karin 
were married at the time of Baldwin’s trial, Karin’s 
testimony should have been excluded based upon 
spousal privilege, pursuant to § 26-1-802, MCA.
State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489, 
495, 81 P.3d 488, 493.  
The majority opinion went no further on its analysis of the 
application of the marital communications privilege, for which 
Justice Rice took them to task in his concurrence, joined by 
Justices Gray and Leaphart.  He correctly observed:
¶ 33 The Court concludes in ¶ 26 that because 
Baldwin and Karin were married at the time of 
trial, Karin’s testimony in regard to a statement 
made prior to the solemnization of their marriage 
was inadmissible under the spousal privilege 
statute. However, this is an incorrect conclusion 
under Montana law. The spousal privilege does 
not bar admission of a statement made between 
two persons who were not married at the time 
the statement was made. (Emphasis added)
State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489, 
8  As with so many evidentiary error cases, the Court further found the error to 
be harmless, discussing the strength of other evidence on the same issue, and af-
firmed the conviction.
497, 81 P.3d 488, 494.  
Justice Rice did a more thorough analysis and concluded 
that: 
¶ 36 Karin›s testimony was not made inadmissible 
by virtue of the fact that she and Baldwin were 
married at the time of trial. To the contrary, the 
inquiry centers on their status at the time the 
contested statement was made. If they were not 
married at that time, then the statement could not 
“convey a message from one spouse to the other” 
and could not have been “conveyed in reliance 
on the confidence of the marital relationship.” 
Nettleton, 233 Mont. at 317, 760 P.2d at 739 
(original emphasis). Because the solemnization 
of the marriage had not occurred at the time the 
statement was made, Karin’s testimony about the 
statement was not barred thereby.
318 Mont. at 497.  
In support of his objection at trial, the defendant also 
claimed a pre-existing common-law marriage.  The judge 
excused the jury and held a brief evidentiary hearing on the 
question of the common-law marriage:
The direct and cross-examination produced 
testimony that Baldwin and Karin had not 
shared finances or income tax returns during 
their relationship, had been separated for a year 
prior to the solemnization, that Baldwin had an 
intervening relationship with another woman, and 
that the parties decided to marry by solemnization 
because, according to Karin, “I wanted to get 
married. We’ve been wanting to get married a 
long time.” 
State v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489, 
498, 81 P.3d 488, 495.  
Justice Rice concluded that the “District Court’s evidentiary 
ruling that no common law marriage existed was founded upon 
substantial evidence, and therefore, Karin’s testimony concern-
ing the statement was not barred by the spousal privilege.” State 
v. Baldwin, 2003 MT 346, 318 Mont. 489, 498, 81 P.3d 488, 495.  
The proof of a common-law marriage is beyond the scope of 
this article, but I can suggest that this issue requires extensive 
fact-finding, and would be better dealt with in a motion and 
hearing in limine than by excusing the jury in the middle of a 
trial.
WAIVING THE PRIVILEGE
Clearly privileged confidential spousal communications 
may be admissible if the spouse who claims the privilege waives 
it.  Waiver can occur by voluntary disclosure of the contents of 
the communication by the person who now claims the privi-
lege or by failure of counsel to object in discovery or at trial.  
Additionally, some Montana cases have refused to allow the 
privilege when sexual abuse has occurred, reasoning that the 
PRIVILEGE, from previous page
PRIVILEGE, next page 
Page 40 March 2014
“home” which the privilege is designed to support no longer 
exists.
Voluntary Disclosure Outside Judicial Proceedings
One way waiver can occur is if the spouse him/herself 
“shares” the communication with someone outside the mar-
riage before trial.  An essential element of a privileged com-
munication is that it was made in confidence and afterwards 
kept confidential.  Thus, a husband who tells his wife something 
during their marriage, but then describes that conversation to 
his hunting buddy9 has waived the privilege and should lose his 
objection at trial.  M.R.E. 503 covers this:
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a 
privilege against disclosure waives the privilege 
if the person or the person’s predecessor while 
the holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or 
consents to disclosure of any significant part of the 
privileged matter. This rule does not apply if the 
disclosure itself is privileged.
(b) Joint holders. Where two or more persons are 
joint holders of a privilege, a waiver of the right of 
a particular joint holder to claim the privilege does 
not affect the right of another joint holder to claim 
the privilege.
In re Marriage of Sarsfield seemed to use this waiver theory 
when it affirmed admission of an ex-wife’s testimony about 
things her husband told her while they were married.  The 
Sarsfields were involved in a custody dispute which arose when 
the former Mrs. Sarsfield agreed to marry a man (“M.M.”) with 
a history of child sexual abuse.  Mr. Sarsfield sought a change in 
custody for the Sarsfield children, and called the ex-wife of the 
prospective new husband to testify at trial. 
M.M.’s former wife was called as a witness. She 
testified that her daughter had been removed from 
the family home because she had been sexually 
abused by M.M. She had never witnessed any 
incidents of abuse, but her husband had admitted 
the incidents to her. M.M. indicated to his wife 
that, for at least six years prior to his admission, 
he had “used various items, his hands, pokers, 
various instruments of that sort to induce her [the 
daughter] in various ways” on several occasions. 
No criminal charges were filed against M.M., but 
the daughter was removed by authorities and 
underwent treatment for emotional problems 
connected with the abuse.
After her return from therapy, M.M. admitted 
to his wife that he had sexually molested the girl 
again. The daughter was removed to a childrens’ 
9  It is ok to disclose the communication to another person with whom the 
spouse has a privileged relationship, such as his attorney or minister.  See the last 
sentence of Rule 503(a).
[sic] home where she continues to undergo 
therapy. According to the former wife, M.M. is 
not allowed to see the girl without others present. 
He admitted his problem to counselors, but has 
apparently not committed any deviant acts since 
the last incident with his daughter.
In re Marriage of Sarsfield, 206 Mont. 397, 405, 
671 P.2d 595, 600 (1983).  
Although the ex-wife’s observations during the marriage 
to M.M. would not now be covered by a spousal testimonial 
privilege, it did exist back then, and her entire testimony should 
have been barred under it.  Even under the more limited extant 
spousal communications privilege, the ex-wife’s testimony 
about what M.M. told her in confidence during their marriage 
should have been privileged and the objection sustained.
The custodial mother’s attorney did object at trial on the 
basis of the spousal privilege, to no avail. The trial judge allowed 
the testimony, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision in 
a very murky paragraph:
Clearly, the subject of the supposedly privileged 
communications had been revealed to welfare 
authorities and, as it turned out later, to M.M.’s 
“counselor,” Paster [sic] Miller. We agree with the 
trial court that the testimony of M.M.’s wife was 
not protected by the spousal privilege under these 
facts. 
In re Marriage of Sarsfield, 206 Mont. 397, 407, 
671 P.2d 595, 601 (1983).  
This reasoning is wrong, at least under the current version 
of M.R.E. 503.  The discloser of the communication to welfare 
authorities was not M.M. himself, but his wife.  She cannot 
waive the privilege unilaterally, per M.R.E. 503(b), or if he does 
not have an opportunity to invoke the privilege.  M.R.E. 504 
provides: 
Rule 504. Privileged matter disclosed under 
compulsion or without opportunity to claim the 
privilege.  A claim of privilege is not defeated by 
a disclosure which was (a) compelled erroneously 
or (b) made without opportunity to claim the 
privilege.
Thus, the then-wife’s revelation to “welfare authorities” 
should not operate as a waiver of the husband’s spousal privi-
lege.  Further, M.M.’s own disclosure to his “counselor” or 
“paster”? might itself be privileged10, and thus fit M.R.E. 503’s 
clear provision that waiver by voluntary disclosure: “does not 
10  Montana recognizes privileges for communications with members of the 
clergy, M.C.A. 26-1-804, and psychologists, M.C.A. 26-1-807.  The Sarsfield opinion 
does not discuss either of these in detail, but it does evince skepticism about the 
status of the “counselor.” 
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apply if the disclosure itself is privileged.”11
Child Abuse
Sarsfield did offer another basis for its refusal to apply the 
spousal privilege, which seems to have been the real reason 
M.M.’s ex-wife could testify:
This privilege, however, is subject to the maxim 
that, when the reason for a rule ceases to exist, 
so then should the rule. See Section 1-3-201, 
MCA. Thus, in Matter of J.H., we held that once 
a family member has been sexually abused, the 
sanctity of the home and therefore the reason 
for the rule are simultaneously destroyed, 640 
P.2d at 447, 39 St.Rep. at 269, and that a mother 
could testify about her husband’s sexual abuse of 
their son in a child neglect proceeding, where the 
father was a party to the action. In the immediate 
case, the sexual abuse of M.M.’s daughter 
decidedly contributed to the destruction of the 
family home and M.M.’s marriage. Under the 
circumstances, we believe the privilege concerning 
communications about this abuse died with the 
marriage, and we are disinclined to invoke the 
privilege even though M.M. and his former wife 
are not parties to this custody battle.
In re Marriage of Sarsfield, 206 Mont. 397, 406-07, 
671 P.2d 595, 600-01 (1983). 
Five years later, the Montana Supreme Court left the 
Sarsfield holding, and rationale in child abuse cases, standing, 
but acknowledged the difficulty it presents:
In this case, we are concerned only with 
spouses. Rather than muddying the waters by 
attempting to apply the rule from Sarsfield and 
J.H. to the present situation, we will evaluate the 
District Court’s ruling in light of the threshold 
characteristics outlined above.
State v. Nettleton, 233 Mont. 308, 315-16, 760 P.2d 
733, 738 (1988).  
This judge-made “child abuse” exception is a possible av-
enue to invading the marital privilege, and you might as well try 
it if it fits your situation, but I wouldn’t bet on it.
Failure to Object
The other avenue to waiver is failure to object in discovery 
or at trial.  A recent example occurred in a poaching case, where 
the estranged wife went to Fish and Game and turned in her 
husband for several instances of hunting out of season and for 
11  The spousal privilege statute now does address this issue, but its waiver is 
much narrower and would not have affected the privilege of M.M. in the Sarsfield 
situation: The privilege does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one 
spouse against the other or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime commit-
ted by one spouse against the other or against a child of either spouse.
M.C.A. 26-1-802.
possession of illegal golden eagle feathers and parts.  At trial, 
the then-divorced wife testified about a written communication 
from her husband during the marriage.  On appeal, the hus-
band claimed error.  The Supreme Court held:
¶ 30 Torgerson contends on appeal that the 
District Court violated § 26–1–802, MCA, in 
admitting the above testimony by Doane. He 
claims the court had granted him a continuing 
objection on grounds of spousal immunity.
¶ 31 As indicated above, the record reflects that 
the court told defense counsel prior to trial “[i]
f [spousal immunity] does come up, raise your 
objections, if you want a continuing objection to 
some of those things.” Torgerson did not follow 
the District Court’s directive; nor did he object 
to the testimony he now argues was improperly 
admitted. As a result, we conclude he may not 
now argue trial court error in this regard. See § 
46–20–104(2), MCA; State v. Clausell, 2001 MT 
62, ¶ 25, 305 Mont. 1, ¶ 25, 22 P.3d 1111, ¶ 25 
(citation omitted).
State v. Torgerson, 2008 MT 303, 345 Mont. 532, 
539, 192 P.3d 695, 700.  
Ouch! Not only must you object, you must keep objecting.  
I myself am not a fan of the “continuing objection” precisely 
because it is unclear when you are objecting, what you are 
objecting to, and what the judge’s ruling is.  If you are going 
to use that route (for the strategic purpose of not irritating the 
jury with a constant stream of objections), be sure to articulate 
exactly what your “continuing objection” covers.  In the perfect 
world, try to get the court to state on the record both that you 
have constructively objected to all questions and answer about 
what one spouse told the other during the marriage, and that 
the judge has overruled your objection on each and every such 
piece of testimony.  
PREVENTING WAIVER
Client Instruction
A sad fact of lawyering is that our clients do not check with 
us before they go for coffee with friends.  The corollary is that 
we often come to the party too late, and the client may already 
have shared his conversation with his wife with an outsider, de-
stroying the spousal communications privilege.  However, once 
the client does cross your threshold, it is imperative to instruct 
her about privileges in general, and if she is or has been mar-
ried, the spousal communications privilege in general.  Tell her 
that she can tell you things you must and can keep confidential, 
and that the same is true of her conversations with her husband, 
but that if she tells anyone else (friend, mother, neighbor etc.) 
about the contents of those privileged conversations, she loses 
the privilege.  She is the owner of the privilege, and only she can 
protect it.
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Objection
Once you, the lawyer, have come on board in the case, you 
share the burden of maintaining the privilege during discovery 
and at trial.  You can invoke the privilege, and you can lose it by 
failure to do so.  
 M.R.Civ.P. 26b specifically permits an objection to any 
discovery question calling for privileged information: “Parties 
may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter…” 
The form of the objection itself is simple: “Objection, spousal 
privilege.”  However, Montana now echoes the F.R.Civ.P. and 
requires the objector to provide information to back up the 
claim of privilege:
(6) Claiming Privilege or Protecting Trial-
Preparation Materials.  
A) Information Withheld. When a party 
withholds information otherwise discoverable 
by claiming that the information is privileged 
or subject to protection as trial-preparation 
material, the party must:    
   (i) expressly make the claim; and     
  (ii) describe the nature of the documents, 
communications, or things not produced 
or disclosed -- and do so in a manner 
that, without revealing information itself 
privileged or protected, will enable other 
parties to assess the claim.
M.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(6).  To fulfill this requirement, you should 
indicate that the information involves an oral or written com-
munication between spouses during the marriage, being as 
specific as you can about the form and dates of the communica-
tions without divulging the contents of the communications.
This advice is fairly easy to follow during written discovery, 
when you have time to reflect and craft responses.  It is more 
difficult, but equally important, to guard the privilege during 
oral testimony at deposition or in trial.  You must object and in-
struct the witness not to answer (until a judge has ruled on the 
objection).  In depositions, you don’t have the luxury of a ruling 
in limine, and a waiver of the privilege there may lead to a rul-
ing that the privilege has been waived at trial.  I once had a case 
against a former student whom I liked very much (luckily, I had 
taught the student Civil Procedure but not Evidence; still…) In 
the defendant’s deposition, I asked him: “Have you talked to 
anyone else about this?” He said: “Yes, my wife.”  There was no 
reaction from his lawyer, and so on I went for about 5 minutes, 
with no objection: “What did you tell her?” “What did she say?”  
The defendant eventually told me that his wife had objected 
strenuously to his plan, and had told him both that it was im-
moral, illegal, and stupid. (She wasn’t wrong).  I was conflicted 
the whole time this was going on, wanting my former student 
to jump up and stop me, but that never happened and of course 
my paramount duty was to my client.  (The case settled, so we 
never got to the admissibility of those answers at trial.)
The obvious cue is a question like: 
“What did your wife tell you about…?”  
OBJECTION! PRIVILEGE! 
It is much more likely that the question will be less obvious, 
or that the conversation will come out in response to another 
type of question altogether.  The trick is to recognize and object 
as soon as the privilege becomes apparent:
“And then what happened?”
“Well, I was so shook up that I went straight home 
and told my wife …” 
OBJECTION! PRIVILEGE!  
[… “that I had hit a bicyclist and left him on the 
side of the road”]
Remember that “communication” does not have to be ver-
bal.  Obviously, written communications like letters (remember 
those?), notes, and emails are all communications which are 
privileged if sent by one spouse to another during the marriage.  
“I am handing you a document premarked as 
Exhibit A.”
“Can you identify Exhibit A?” 
“Yes.”
“How can you identify Exhibit A?” 
“It is in my ex-wife’s handwriting”
OBJECTION! PRIVILEGE! MAY I VOIR DIRE 
outside the presence of the jury?
“Sir, is Exhibit A a letter sent by your ex-wife?” 
“Yes.”
“Was it sent to you?” 
“Yes.”
“At the time she sent you this letter, you were still 
married, weren’t you?” 
“Yes.”
I RENEW MY OBJECTION.  EXHIBIT A IS A 
PRIVILEGED SPOUSAL COMMUNICATION. 
You should file a motion in limine to assert the privilege 
and get a pretrial ruling if you anticipate that a spouse will be 
called as a witness at trial.  Even if you do this, remember State 
v. Torgerson (discussed above) and object to every piece of tes-
timony at trial which invades the spousal privilege.  Watch out 
for opponents who might try to sneak around a pretrial ruling 
by indirect language, and for witnesses who testify, wittingly or 
not, about what their spouses told them. You may have already 
won a ruling that spousal privilege applies, but it is up to you to 
get the benefit of the ruling.   
Rescuing the Privilege
The recently-revised M.R.Civ.P provide a mechanism for 
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“clawing back” privileged material produced during discovery:
(B) Information Produced. If information 
produced in discovery is subject to a claim of 
privilege, the party making the claim may notify 
any party that received the information of the 
claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a 
party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy 
the specified information and any copies it has; 
must not use or disclose the information until the 
claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to 
retrieve the information if the party disclosed it 
before being notified; and may promptly present 
the information to the court under seal for a 
determination of the claim. The producing party 
must preserve the information until the claim is 
resolved.
M.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(6)(B).  I have not found any cases applying 
this provision to production of marital privileged information, 
but I would use this if I inadvertently sent in my discovery re-
sponses a letter or email between spouses.  It might also be use-
ful in the deposition scenario I described above, if the opposing 
lawyer had gone back to the office and realized that a breach of 
the privilege had just occurred.  Note that this rule does not set 
any standard for when disclosure amounts to waiver, but it does 
freeze the use of the information once a notification and request 
is made and provides a process for a court determination of the 
effect of the disclosure.
DEVELOPING PROOF OF WAIVER
If the party-spouse objects to questions (in discov-
ery or at trial) about conversations with spouse, the opponent 
should investigate (through discovery and otherwise) whether 
the objector discussed the spousal conversation with anyone 
else.  Example:
Q. Did you talk to anyone else about this 
transaction?
A. Yes.
Q.  With whom?
A.  My wife.
Q. What did you say to her about the transaction?
Counsel: OBJECTION. PRIVILEGED. DO NO 
ANSWER.
Q.  Don’t tell me what you said to your wife, or 
she to you.  But I do want to know whether you 
have told anyone else about the conversation with 
your wife.  Did you tell any other person about 
what you said to your wife, or what she said to 
you?
A.  My lawyer.
Counsel: OBJECTION. PRIVILEGED. DO NOT 
ANSWER.
Q. Don’t tell me what you told your lawyer, either.  
Was there anyone else besides your lawyer to 
whom you described your conversation with your 
wife?
A. Yes, I told my mother about that conversation.  
I told Mom what I told my wife, and what my wife 
said back to me.
Q. Aha! What did you tell your mother12?
Q. Now let’s go back: what did you tell your wife 
about the transaction?
Because the party himself disclosed the content of the spou-
sal communication, he waived the protection of the privilege 
and must divulge the communication with his wife. 
CAVEAT:  PRIVILEGE ONLY PROTECTS THE 
COMMUNICATION, NOT THE FACT
Obviously, a privilege does not prevent the discovery of the 
underlying fact itself.  The prosecutor can still investigate and 
present evidence as to the identity of that guy who ran down 
Arthur Avenue in Missoula carrying a semi-automatic hand-
gun and a paper bag (presumably containing the loot from his 
robbery of the Taco Bell at 9:30 a.m. on a recent snowy morn-
ing), resulting in a 3 hour extremely inconvenient (just sayin’) 
lockdown of the University of Montana.  The state just can’t do 
it by putting a wife on the stand to say “my husband told me13 
he was the masked man.”  
MORAL OF THE STORY
One of the benefits of marriage is the ability to confide in 
your spouse without fear that she will be compelled to testify 
against you about what you told her.  (You no longer get the 
ability to prevent her from being called to the stand to recount 
that she saw you with the bloody knife, burning your bloody 
clothes, on the night of the stabbing).  Only the communica-
tions you make during the marriage are protected; it is your 
marital status at the time of the communication, not at the time 
of trial, which counts.  Although it is possible to obtain the 
privilege by proving to the court at trial that you were mar-
ried by common law at the time of the conversation, it is much 
easier and clearer to go to the courthouse, get a license, and go 
through a formal ceremony.   You can freely divulge your most 
intimate secrets to your husband and know that he can’t testify 
about them, even if you do end up getting divorced.  So, put a 
ring on it!  
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law 
where she teaches civil procedure, evidence, family law, and remedies.
12  Neither the FRE nor the MRE recognize any parent-child privilege, so disclo-
sure to the mother amounts to disclosure of the contents of a privileged conversa-
tion just as if the husband described the privileged conversation to a bartender.
13  Of course, this would not be hearsay, per M.R.E. 801d2a: “A statement is not 
hearsay if… The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own 
statement…”
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